Although high crime rates among disadvantaged men partly explains their high risk of incarceration, increasing imprisonment rates in the 1980s and 1990s is not closely associated with crime trends (Boggess and Bound 1997) . Instead, shifts in criminal justice policy fueled penal system growth by intensifying the punishment of drug and violent offenders, and recidivists (Blumstein and Beck 1999; Mauer 1999; Tonry 1996) . The policy-driven rise in incarceration motivates a reexamination of the economic effects of imprisonment.
I examine the effect of incarceration on wages in the context of growing inequality in the U.S. labor market. My analysis departs from earlier research by treating incarceration as a key life event that triggers a cumulative spiral of disadvantage (Sampson and Laub 1993) . In this approach, incarceration reduces not just the level of wages but also the rate of wage growth over the life course. The life path of ex-inmates diverges from the usual employment trajectory in which earnings mobility for young men is generated by steady jobs with regular career ladders (Spilerman 1977) . Combining life course perspectives on crime and employment, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 1983-1999, to estimate the wage trajectory of ex-convicts. Unlike earlier research studying this time period, my analysis also controls for declining wages among men with little schooling.
If incarceration slows wage growth at the individual level, the prison boom may have increased wage inequality in the aggregate. Was the growth in wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s due to the poor labor market performance of low-skill and minority ex-convicts? Although some claim that-"mass imprisonment" has significant aggregate effects (Garland 2001; Wacquant 2000) , the size of these effects has not been systematically studied. Pervasive incarceration among low-skill minority men may increase wage inequality within and across racial and ethnic groups. I investigate this question by calculating the effects of incarceration on wage inequality using estimates of the impact of incarceration on individual earnings. By focusing on the life course and aggregate effects of imprisonment on wages, I aim to draw the penal system into an institutional account of economic inequality.
INCARCERATION AND EARNINGS
Most research relating the criminal justice system to wages focuses on estimating a main effect-a constant decrement in wages attributed to, say, criminal conviction or incarceration. A common design links arrest records to earnings data from unemployment insurance reports (Grogger 1995; Kling 1999; Lott 1990; Waldfogel 1994a ). Research with this design finds transitory effects of arrest or conviction, but persistent effects for prison time: The earnings loss associated with imprisonment is found to range between 10 and 30 percent. A few analyses of survey data find that youth detained in correctional facilities before age 20 have higher unemployment rates and receive lower wages a decade or more after incarceration (Freeman 1992 ; Western and Beckett 1999; also see Sampson and Laub 1993:162-68 ).
INCARCERATION AND DiSRUPTED CAREERS
Previous research on incarceration neglects the tendency of earnings to grow over the life course. Longitudinal studies of careers find that internal labor markets in large firms, public sector pay schedules, on-thejob training, and union seniority provisions all contribute to job continuity and earnings growth among young men (DiPrete 1989; Spilerman 1977 ; also see the review by Rosenfeld 1992:45-50). If ex-convicts ultimately recover their pre-incarceration wage level, the life course perspective suggests they may still be worse off because wages would have grown even higher without incarceration.
While life course research on occupations ties earnings growth to employment in career jobs, a life course perspective on crime treats incarceration as a turning point that disrupts key transitions, restricting access to such jobs (Sampson and Laub 1993) . If imprisonment redirects the usual employment trajectory, the main effect of incarceration will be supplemented by an interaction effect in which wages grow more slowly with age for ex-convicts.
Three mechanisms explain why prison or jail time is linked to slow wage growth. Incarceration is stigmatizing, and it erodes human and social capital. The negative relationship between crime and earnings is usually attributed to the stigma of criminal conviction. A criminal record signals to employers that a potential employee might be untrustworthy. Thus, employers are less likely to hire ex-offenders than comparable job applicants without criminal records (Holzer 1996 :59; Schwartz and Skolnick 1962). The stigma of conviction is especially prohibitive of entry into high-status or career jobs. Men in trusted or high-income occupations before conviction experience especially large earnings losses after release from prison (Lott 1990; Waldfogel 1994a ). Similar observations are reported for white-collar offenders (Kling 1999 ). The stigma of conviction also has legal consequences that mostly affect career jobs. A felony record can temporarily disqualify an individual from employment in licensed or professional occupations, skilled trades, or in the public sector (Office of the Pardon Attorney 1996). The stigma of conviction thus reduces exconvicts' access to jobs characterized by trust and continuity of employment.
Incarceration also erodes job skills. Time out of employment prevents the acquisition of skills gained through work experience. As a result, for some categories of federal prison inmates, earnings decrease as sentence length increases (Kling 1999 
EARNINGS INEQUALITY AND MASS IMPRISONMENT
The penal system's production of large numbers of marginal workers suggests a provocative account of the increase in men's wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. During these decades, increasing inequality was produced by the emergence of a flat wage trajectory among men with little education (Bernhardt et al. 2001 ). Evidence of racial and ethnic division is given by the growing employment share of black and Hispanic workers in low-paying, low-quality jobs (Wright and Dwyer 2000) . In light of these trends, the prison boom may have increased inequality by supplying the labor market with low-skill minority ex-inmates who remain mired at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The collective effect of the penal system is captured by Garland's (2001:2) term "mass imprisonment." In his formulation, the incarceration rate is so high for some groups that its influence is felt not just by individuals, but by broad demographic groups. A few researchers have connected the polarization of the American labor market to mass imprisonment. In an early statement of the broad influence of the criminal justice system, Freeman (1991) observes that "the magnitudes of incarceration, probation, and parole among black drop outs, in particular, suggest that crime has become an intrinsic part of the youth unemployment and poverty problem, rather than deviant behavior on the margin" (p. 1). Wacquant (2000) argues that the prison, alongside the ghetto, has become a system of forced confinement that marginalizes minority communities from mainstream economic life. Along similar lines, the U.S. penal system in the 1980s and 1990s has been described as a state intervention in the labor market that increased race and class inequalities in earnings and employment ( . NLSY incarceration rates track the aggregate (BJS) data well until the mid1990s when survey respondents begin to age out of the penal system. We can thus be confident that the NLSY correctional residence item provides reasonable coverage of prison inmates.
DATA AND MODEL
I conducted a regression analysis of wage mobility in a sample of young men. To trace mobility in earnings, data on log hourly wages, yi, is analyzed for respondent i in year t for the period 1983-1998. The hourly wage rate is measured for the respondent's current or most recent main job. The wage data are standardized by the consumer price index deflator to obtain earnings in constant 1984 dollars. Like other work on the NLSY, I discard observations with zero wages and a few outliers greater than five times the median wage (see Bernhardt et al. 2001 ). Unlike administrative records on earnings, the NLSY wage captures temporary and parttime work, and work for small and public sector employers. Because illegal earnings are likely missed, the analysis provides information about the effects of incarceration on ex-inmates' legitimate economic opportunities.
The regression models are built around three main predictors. First, the log of respondent's age, Ai,, captures the nonlinear age-earnings profile. The age effect in earnings models is often specified to be quadratic (Murphy and Welch 1990:203 where xit is a vector of other covariates, and Sit is an error term. For this model, incarceration produces a shift in log wages of size a2. The career disruption theory suggests that incarceration also influences wage growth after release. This effect is described by equation 2, the interaction model:
The interaction model estimates the ageearnings profile of noninmates and ex-inmates by adding an interaction between log age and prior incarceration. If ex-inmates have limited access to primary sector jobs with age-graded pay scales, y will be negative. A negative coefficient indicates that the earnings profile of ex-inmates is flat compared to that of noninmates. Throughout the analysis, log age is written in mean deviation form so the main effect, a2, gives the wage gap between noninmates and ex-inmates at average age. Although mass imprisonment may explain some of the polarization of the American labor market, the analysis must also confront the rival explanation that declining wages among ex-convicts results from the general decline in wages among low-education men in the 1980s and 1990s. To model this period effect, the covariate vector contains terms for year of interview (t), years of education (Eit), and the interaction Eitt. This model captures the fall in earnings among low-education men, independently of any effect of imprisonment. As shown below, the age-earnings profiles of nonconvicts and exconvicts are highly sensitive to these period effects.
Without further specification, models portrayed in equations 1 and 2 provide poor estimates of the causal effects of incarceration. Characteristics of criminal offenders that where Ci = 1. This approach yields substantively identical results to those reported below. place them at high risk of incarceration may also reduce their wages. Consequently, the low wages attributed to incarceration may really be due to the weak earnings capacity of offenders. The endogeneity of prison time to worker productivity is the key methodological challenge for research on the labor market effects of incarceration (Rossi et al. 1980 ). Instrumental variables, difference-ofdifference estimates, and fixed-and randomeffects models have been used to adjust for the unobserved heterogeneity of prison inmates (Freeman 1992; Kling 1999; Western and Beckett 1999) .
In this analysis, I adopt three different strategies to control for the nonrandom selection of men into prison and jail. First, several sources of selectivity are explicitly controlled (Table 2 lists Including work experience reduces the OLS coefficient to less than half the fixedeffect estimate. The fixed-effect and OLS incarceration effects are nearly equal when work experience is excluded. OLS attributes most of the gap between pre-and post-incarceration wages to differences in work experience. In effect, most of the sample who are never incarcerated (who have high experience and pay) are in the same pre-incarceration comparison group as men who are later incarcerated (who have low experience and pay). The fixed-effects models (Models 2, 3, and 4) remove large differences in work experience between never-incarcerated and pre-incarcerated men as a confounding source of variation. The fixed-effects models thus attribute much less of the gap between pre-and post-incarceration wages to differences in work experience. Adding period effects reduces the estimated incarceration penalty slightly to 16 percent, but the coefficient remains statistically significant (Table  4 , Model 3). The size of the incarceration effect is unchanged by restricting analysis to the at-risk subsample of men reporting crime or delinquency (Table 4 , Model 4).
Job and Labor Market Characteristics

WAGE GROWTH AND INCARCERATION
If ex-prisoners have trouble getting career jobs, incarceration should also reduce wage growth. Estimates of the age x incarceration interaction are reported in Table 5 . For all models, estimated interaction effects are negative and statistically significant. In the simplest model (Model 5)-which controls just for human capital, job, and personal characteristics-the interaction effect exceeds the main effect of age. This estimate suggests that incarceration eliminates all wage growth among ex-convicts. Introducing fixed effects (Model 6) yields similar results. Adding the main effect of age to the interaction effect (.53 -.72 = -.19) shows that the wages of ex-inmates declined through their twenties and thirties.
The results are sensitive to period effects in which the effect of education grows between 1983 and 1998 (Table 5 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 includes controls for juvenile contact with the criminal justice system, cognitive ability, race, and ethnicity. All models control for work experience, enrollment status, drug use, marital status, union membership, industry, and region. The full sample includes all respondents. The at-risk subsample includes respondents who report crime, delinquency or any incarceration. Results for control variables are reported in Appendix A. *p <.05 **p < .01 (two-tailed tests) the first year for the regression analysis, the education coefficient equals (4 x .0039) = .016. By 1998, the education effect had grown to .074, reflecting the decline in earnings among low-skill men. When the effect of education on earnings is allowed to grow, the age X incarceration interaction declines by about one-third. The age coefficient also increases substantially with Model 7. As a result, the age-earnings profile of ex-inmates is much steeper when period effects are included. Essentially the same results are given by the subsample of men at high risk of crime (Model 8).
The sensitivity of results can be studied by plotting the age-earnings profile of ex-convicts and nonconvicts (Figure 2) . The ageearnings profiles are based on the estimates of Models 6 and 7 in Table 5 Results from the interaction models are reported separately for blacks, whites, and Hispanics in Table 6 . I can assess the magnitude of the interaction effect in relation to the main effect of age. Across the three groups, the interaction effects are about 30 percent smaller than the age main effect, indicating that incarceration reduces wage Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 5 includes controls for juvenile contact with the criminal justice system, cognitive ability, race, and ethnicity. All models control for work experience, enrollment status, drug use, marital status, union membership, public sector employment, industry, and region. The full sample includes all respondents. The at-risk subsample includes respondents who report crime, delinquency, or any incarceration. Results for control variables are reported in Appendix A. * <.05 ** < .01 (two-tailed tests) growth by almost one-third. The coefficient for the age x incarceration interaction is roughly the same for Hispanics and whites, but is smaller for blacks. Wages grow slowly for blacks, and the relative decline in wage growth among black ex-convicts is about 25 percent (.20/.77), slightly smaller than the relative decline for whites. These findings point to the persistent effects of adult incarceration on wages: The wage gap between nonconvicts and ex-convicts grows as workers age. Contrast with this the research on employment, which finds that the effects of adult incarceration decay after several years (Western and Beckett 1999). Other analysis (not shown), using a more elaborate model of wage dynamics, supports the interpretation of the persistent effects of incarceration on wages over the life course. This divergence in findings between results on employment and wages is consistent with the idea that exconvicts are ultimately able to find employment after their release, but the jobs they get offer little wage growth.
WAGE INEQUALITY AND INCARCERATION
Because incarceration is common among minority and low-skill men, the earnings penalty experienced by ex-convicts may influence aggregate wage inequality. To test this mass imprisonment hypothesis, I predict wages using a pooled version of the regressions reported in Table 6 . In the pooled analysis, the coefficients for the age x incarceration interactions vary by race and ethnicity. Because interest centers on the entire wage distribution, estimation is based on the full NLSY sample. Two sets of predicted wages are calculated: The first is based on the observed predictors; the second uses all the observed predictors, except the incarceration variables, which are set to zero, Cit = Pit = 0. The second series of predictions estimates the wages we would observe if none of the NLSY respondents went to prison or jail between 1979 and 1998. Two kinds of inequality are examined. First, we might expect incarceration to increase inequality within racial/ethnic groups by lowering earnings among low-education men. We estimate this effect by calculating the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of log wages at observed and zero incarceration. Second, incarceration will likely increase inequality between whites and blacks, and between whites and Hispanics, because minority incarceration rates are relatively high. This effect is estimated by calculating the whiteminority differences in mean log wages. Predicted inequality is reported for models with and without period effects.
The measures of hypothetical wage inequality take no account of the spillover effect of decarcerated workers on the earnings of noninmates. An increase in the supply of low-skill workers through decarceration may drive down wages among low-skill workers who have not been to prison or jail. The net impact of spillover effects on inequality is unclear. Given the capacity of the U.S. labor market to absorb new entrants in the 1990s, however, the spillover effect may not be large. Table 7 reports wage inequality estimated at observed and zero incarceration for men interviewed between 1994 and 1998. If we ignore period effects, in which the earnings of low-education men decreased through the 1980s and 1990s, wage inequality among whites would be about 5.3 percent lower if the incarceration rate were zero between 1979 and 1998. The effect of incarceration on inequality is twice as large for blacks and Hispanics. The largest effects are for white versus Hispanic inequality, which would be 15 percent lower but for the effects of incarceration.
As in the regression reported above, incarceration effects are reduced if period effects are considered. If the effect of education on earnings is allowed to become larger over time, incarceration is estimated to have increased wage inequality among blacks and Hispanics and between blacks and whites by 8 to 9 percent. Again, the largest incarceration effect is found for white-Hispanic inequality. The estimates show that the difference in mean log wages of whites and Hispanics would be 12.2 percent lower in the absence of incarceration. The impact of period effects on estimates of inequality underlines the result that a significant part of the the low earnings of ex-convicts is due to wage stagnation among low-education men.
Analysis of the effects of incarceration on inequality might be elaborated in several ways. One might focus on groups, like non- 
DISCUSSION
This analysis has reported evidence for the hypothesis that incarceration is a turning point that reduces the earnings mobility of young men. The analysis also considered whether the individual-level effects of incarceration on earnings summed to a large aggregate effect on wage inequality. Analysis of the NLSY provided mixed support for these claims. There is strong evidence that incarceration reduces the wages of ex-inmates by 10 to 20 percent. More relevant for the idea of imprisonment as a turning point, incarceration was also found to reduce the rate of wage growth by about 30 percent. Indeed, ex-inmates experienced marked declines in real wages as they moved through the life course in the 1980s and 1990s. Much of this decline, however, resulted from an increasing penalty for low education, widely experienced by men without a college education. The aggregate effects of incarceration on wage inequality were relatively small. Differential incarceration accounts for almost 10 percent of the mean difference in wages across race and ethnic groups. In sum, the analysis provides strong evidence for slow wage growth among ex-inmates. The effects of incarceration on aggregate wage inequality are more modest. Although the effects of incarceration on wage inequality were relatively small, the true effect in the population may be larger. Because of the way incarceration is measured in the NLSY, the proportion of men with prison records is somewhat underestimated and the underestimate is larger for blacks than for whites. If the NLSY accurately captured the true prevalence of imprisonment in the population, estimated black-white inequality due to incarceration would be higher. In addition, with very high incarceration rates among some groups like low-education black men, the stigma of imprisonment may attach to the group as a whole rather than to individuals. This effect would be reflected in the overall wage disadvantage of black noncollege men, rather than the estimated effect of incarceration.
Relatively small incarceration effects for blacks hint at this process, in which the labor market does not differentiate so strongly between black noninmates and ex-inmates. Further analysis would examine how blackwhite wage differentials among noncollege men have changed over time as the incarceration rate has increased.
The findings here can also be placed in the wider context of research on crime and inequality. Research relating crime to labor market outcomes views stable employment as an important source of criminal desistance (Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997; Sampson and Laub 1993). These effects appear strongest for men in their late twenties and thirties (Uggen 2000) . The low wages earned by exinmates may thus be associated with further crime after release from prison. The causal path from incarceration to irregular employment to crime may be especially damaging because the economic pain of incarceration is largest for older men-precisely the group that benefits most from stable employment. This analysis also supports the claim by Sampson and Laub (1993) that incarceration adds to an accumulation of disadvantage. Although Sampson and Laub (1993) focus on the long-term effects of juvenile incarceration, the evidence presented here indicates that adult incarceration can further limit economic mobility in later life.
The effects of incarceration on economic mobility challenge our general understanding of the influence of institutions on economic opportunity. Research on American racial inequality views institutional change as a progressive influence, but the evidence here indicates that penal expansion has deepened racial inequality. Many researchers attribute improvements in black earnings and employment to school desegregation, affirmative action, and equal employment policies (Card and Krueger 1992; Heckman 1989). The growth of the black middle class is rooted in many of these policies (Wilson 1978) . However, expanding imprisonment has increased racial inequality in earnings and in lifelong careers. Although racial differences in incarceration may not result in a straightforward way from racial bias in policing or the courts (Tonry 1996) , the penal system has influenced the relative distribution of life chances among young poorly educated black men over the last two decades of the twentieth century.
More generally, the penal system has never occupied a central place in the study of American inequality and has been relegated instead to a specialty interest among criminologists. Low incarceration rates throughout most of the twentieth century placed prisons at the distant fringes of the stratification system, far behind the institutional influence of families, schools, labor unions, and the military. By the 1990s, around one-fifth of minority men and a comparable proportion of those with only a high school education will pass through prison at some point in their lives. Under these conditions, it appears that the U.S. penal system has grown beyond disciplining the deviant few, to imposing a systemic influence on broad patterns of social inequality. 
Bruce Western is Professor of Sociology at
APPENDIX A. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES
